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LEX, LIES & VIDEOTAPE
Gregory T. Jones*
Once viewed as the cutting edge of courtroom technology, videotape
has become an increasingly prevalent arrow in the trial lawyer's quiver. Yet
while trial lawyers brandish videotape frequently, many trip over questions
of procedure, admissibility, and technique. Still others fail to take full
advantage of the medium as a high-impact litigation tool.
This article is designed to serve as a practitioner's guide for negotiating
the evidentiary shoals that lie between the attorney and the jury box. After
Part I charts the myriad uses to which videotapes are put, Part II of the
article describes the evolving procedural requirements that apply to
courtroom use. Part III then describes the varying evidentiary considerations
that arise both in civil and criminal cases and analyzes the oversimplified
"re-creation"/ "demonstration" dichotomy that has been employed to control
admissibility of reconstruction videos. Finally, Parts IV and V of the article
explore the various discovery and admissibility issues associated with
surveillance films and Day-in-the-Life documentaries, and the recovery of
costs incurred in producing and replaying videotaped depositions.
I. USES OF VIDEOTAPE
A. Preserving Testimony for Trial
While employed in a whole host of contexts, videotapes are most often
used to present testimony from a witness who cannot attend trial.' The
rationale is simple: Since a videotape enables the trier of fact to monitor
voice inflection, pauses in testimony, facial expressions, and other visual
cues that are otherwise unavailable from a mere written transcript, video-
tapes outstrip the conventional stenographically produced transcript as a
medium for presenting testimony.2 Thus, as a means for offering testimony
from one's own witness, videotapes normally are the medium of choice.
However, a videotape can be a two-edged sword. An inopportune
expression, an extended pause, or an ill-conceived demonstration by the
*. Mr. Jones is a graduate of the University of Virginia (B.A., with distinction, 1977)
and the University of Virginia School of Law (J.D. 1982). He practices tort and commercial
litigation in Little Rock, Arkansas.
1. See, e.g., United States v. Trucis, 89 F.R.D. 671, 674 (E.D. Pa. 1981); In re Daniels,
69 F.R.D. 579, 581 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
2. See Sandidge v. Salen Offshore Drilling Co., 764 F.2d 252, 259 & n.6 (5th Cir.
1985); Riley v. Murdock, 156 F.R.D. 130, 131 & n.3 (E.D.N.C. 1994); Meredith v. Schreiner
Transp., Inc., 814 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 (D. Kan. 1993); King v. Westlake, 264 Ark. 555, 558,
572 S.W.2d 841, 843 (1978).
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witness that would be undetectable in a transcript can prove devastating
when captured on film.3 Thus, the very strengths sought through the use of
video can turn into a liability for the party sponsoring the witness.4
This potential for undermining the witness's credibility creates a second
rationale for videotaping depositions. Nothing satisfies the trial lawyer more
than catching an adverse witness in a lie. Compared to written transcripts,
videotapes can more accurately memorialize impeachment material or
admissions for use at trial. While a stenographic record of a prior
inconsistent statement or admission can be valuable, even the most artfully
crafted questions recorded in a sterile transcript can lose force when read
back to the jury. By contrast, the video replay places the jurors at the very
scene where (and time when) the damaging statements were originally
uttered. With videotape, jurors effectively become eyewitnesses to the
event, rather than mere members of a temporally and visually detached
audience.
B. To Substitute for a Jury View
Videotapes play an equally useful role in the courtroom beyond the
recordation of testimony. They can depict a witness's demonstration of a
sequence of events or movements associated with a fact at issue.5 Likewise,
3. While as a technical matter, film and videotape considerably differ, the two
recordation media share numerous similarities; consequently, for purposes of this article, the
terms are used interchangeably.
4. In federal and many state courts, if one attorney notices a non-video evidentiary
deposition, nothing prevents opposing counsel from attempting to videotape it so long as
advance notice is given. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(3); see infra text accompanying note 25.
This may prove strategically wise if the adverse witness is expected to have a poor "live"
appearance. See Weiss v. Wayes, 132 F.R.D. 152, 153 (M.D. Pa. 1990) (plaintiff entitled
to videotape defendant's expert for use at trial over defendant's objection). See also Riley
v. Murdock, 156 F.R.D. 130, 130-31 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (permitting resumption of deposition
to be videotaped even though initial session was not; video deemed to be superior method
of conveying credibility of witness). Likewise, if one party videotapes a deposition but later
seeks to forgo the testimony due to surprise testimony, the adverse party may still be able
to use the video at trial. See, e.g., Reber v. General Motors Corp., 669 F. Supp. 717, 720
(E.D. Pa. 1987).
5. Rapheld v. Ice, 431 F. Supp. 343, 344-45 (E.D. Mo. 1977) (video showing lack of
plaintiff's injuries). See also Gillen v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 156 F.R.D. 120, 123
(E.D. Pa. 1994) (compelling plaintiff in automobile product liability suit to appear for
videotaping with subject automobile to demonstrate alleged seatbelt defect); Kiraly v. Berkel,
Inc., 122 F.R.D. 186, 187-88 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (issuing order to videotape a reenactment of
plaintiff's accident); Montag v. Board of Educ., 446 N.E.2d 299, 304-05 (I11. App. Ct. 1983)
(admitting film showing gymnastic routine that "still pictures or oral testimony could never
duplicate"); Freeland v. Baker, 422 S.E.2d 315, 315-16 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (video of
arthroscopic surgical procedure admissible). But see Stermer v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. Rptr.
2d 577, 579-80 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (interpreting discovery statute narrowly to foreclose
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videos can be used to portray the workings of equipment, 6 to show the
layout of terrain or visibility conditions,7 or to illustrate scientific principles8
that cannot be shown in the courtroom.
C. Case Evaluation and Settlement
Videotapes can also serve as vital litigation tools outside the courtroom.
They can assist in trial preparation by familiarizing the witness with (or
refreshing the witness's recollection of) an important process or event.9
Videotapes can also enable parties to evaluate the demeanor and estimate the
impact that witnesses would have at trial. The plaintiff's bar has made
excellent use of the medium in producing settlement brochures to be shared
with defense counsel and their clients.' If credibility or effectiveness of a
witness is critical, the attorney can show portions of videotaped depositions
court from compelling plaintiff to demonstrate during videotaped deposition how child was
placed in car seat); Lamendola v. Slocum, 538 N.Y.S.2d 116, 117-18 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989)
(barring plaintiffs attorney from videotaping independent medical examination commissioned
by defendant, but recognizing that videotaping might be permissible if plaintiff's condition
rendered her unable to testify about manner in which examination was conducted).
6. See Bellinger v. Deere & Co., 881 F. Supp. 813, 816 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (video
admitted to show mechanical principles involved in operation of cornpicker); Potlach Corp.
v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 321 Ark. 314, 326, 902 S.W.2d 217, 224-25 (1995) (video of railroad
car dumper admissible to show how equipment operated); Beers v. Western Auto Supply
Co., 646 S.W.2d 812, 815-16 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (use of videos to explain complex
mechanical operations); Roberts v. Homelite Div. of Textron, 109 F.R.D. 664, 667-68 (N.D.
Ind. 1986); Carson v. Burlington Northern, 52 F.R.D. 492, 492-93 (D. Neb. 1971). But see
In re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa, 131 F.R.D. 127, 128-29 (N.D. I11. 1990)
(barring plaintiff from videotaping defendant's crew members inside flight simulator). Even
where the equipment can be brought to the courtroom, the video camera can be used to
circumvent visualization problems inherent in fast-moving or particularly miniaturized
operations. Close up or slow motion settings can be used to demonstrate operations that the
jury cannot otherwise readily see. Moreover, still photographs may be extracted from
videotape and introduced upon proper authentication. See Mobbs v. State, 307 Ark. 505,
512, 821 S.W.2d 769, 774.(1991).
7. Karl v. Burlington N. Ry., 880 F.2d 68, 77 (8th Cir. 1989) (video of railroad
crossing and warning lights); Vinke v. Artim Transp. Sys., Inc., 408 N.E.2d 1112, 1120 (I11.
App. Ct. 1980) (film used to show approach to accident scene and to show distances along
highway); Mize v. Skeen, 468 S.W.2d 733, 737 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1971) (video used to depict
visibility at accident scene).
8. Millers' Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Wichita Flour Mills Co., 257 F.2d 93, 98-99 (10th Cir.
1958) (film used to show certain principles upon which expert based his opinion); Loven v.
State, 831 S.W.2d 387, 392-97 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (medical school training film about
seizure disorders used as a learned treatise).
9. But see James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138, 146 (D. Del. 1982)
(work product privilege waived by showing written documents to witness in preparation for
deposition).
10. See Fred I. Heller, Videotaped Settlement Brochure, in 43 AM. JUR. TRIALs 239
(1991).
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or day-in-the-life documentaries to the client, the insurer, a jury consultant,
or even a focus group." This can often yield far more accurate case
appraisals by the ultimate decision makers than if the client or others were
to rely solely on the attorney's interpretation and description of the witness.
D. Cost Reduction
As noted below, authorization for videotaped depositions in civil cases
arises under language in both state and federal rules that was designed, at
least initially, to help reduce the cost of depositions. Dispensing with a
court reporter 2 (who would otherwise stenographically record testimony)
can cut discovery costs dramatically. Videoconferencing can also be used
as an alternative to telephonic depositions when travel costs for the parties
or witnesses or when time pressures make in-person depositions
impractical. 3 Moreover, when proof at trial would require brief testimony
from numerous experts, 14 video presentation can minimize the hassle and
expense of scheduling and presenting such proof.
E. Other Uses
At least one court has ordered videotaping to rein in unduly
confrontational or obstreperous lawyers.' 5 Some parties have taken video
depositions of expert witnesses for information-sharing purposes. When, for
example, a particular expert, i.e., a "hired gun," is expected to be used
repeatedly by a party, some attorneys have successfully argued that
information sharing, standing alone, creates sufficient justification for
videotaping.' 6 Moreover, in those limited situations in which deposition
11. Cf Kiraly v. Berkel, Inc., 122 F.R.D. 186, 187 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (defendant permitted
to videotape reenactment of machinery accident since it would aid in the evaluation of the
case).
12. See infra text accompanying note 39.
13. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(7) (authorizing depositions to be taken inter alia by "other
remote electronic means").
14. Cf Borchardt v. United States, 133 F.R.D. 547, 547-48 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (permitting
plaintiff to call physician by deposition rather than in person due to cost savings).
15. Milwaukee Concrete Studios, Ltd. v. Greeley Ornamental Concrete Prods., Inc., 140
F.R.D. 373, 379-80 (E.D. Wis. 1991). See also Riley v. Murdock, 156 F.R.D. 130, 131
(E.D.N.C. 1994) (video is more likely to expose coaching by counsel). Unfortunately, not
all attorneys are cowed by the presence of the camera, but if counsel unduly interferes with
the videotaped deposition, remedies exist. See Kelly v. GAF Corp., 115 F.R.D. 257, 257-59
(E.D. Pa. 1987) (ordering new trial due to counsel's unjustified antics during videotaped
evidentiary deposition).
16. See Burlington City Bd. of Educ. v. United States Mineral Prods. Co., 115 F.R.D.
188, 189 (M.D.N.C. 1987) (denying protective order sought on behalf of defendant's expert
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testimony is given in a foreign language, videotapes can act as a backup
resource for refereeing disputes over translations and transcriptions."
Videos are also increasingly used to memorialize a testator's execution of
a will.' 8
II. PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS IN VIDEOTAPING DEPOSITIONS
A. Authorization for Videotaped Depositions
While as early as 1970 the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules strongly
considered allowing depositions to be recorded by videotape as a matter of
course, 9 it was not until 1993 that the practice was ultimately sanctioned at
the federal court level. During the intervening years, appellate courts
adopted varying approaches to the issue, some indirectly encouraging use of
videotapes by circumscribing the lower courts' discretion to deny non-
stenographically recorded depositions, others adopting a less hospitable
stance.2" A hesitance to encourage the new technology can be seen even in
relatively recent cases that, while recognizing the attributes of videotaping,
curiously refuse to embrace the practice.2'
Notwithstanding the delay in fully implementing the videotaping of
depositions, the promulgation of the 1993 Amendments to Rule 30 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure firmly heralded the acceptance of
videotaping as a bona fide, 'eliable recordation medium. Pursuant to those
amendments, under the current language of Rule 30(b)(2), a party may take
a deposition by video recordation without leave of the court and, in fact,
without stipulation from opposing counsel.22
witness who did not want to be videotaped). See also Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 235, 110 Stat. 1214, 1246-47 (1996)
(authorizing closed circuit televising of criminal trials to provide greater public access by
persons having compelling interest in wake of change of venue).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Drogoul, 1 F.3d 1546, 1554-55 (11th Cir. 1993).
18. See Videotaped Wills: Ready for Prime Time, 9 PROB. L.J. 139 (1989); Hammer
v. Powers, 819 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Tex. App. 1991) (videotaped signing of will was used to
help establish testatrix's testamentary capacity).
19. See 4A JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, 30.09[1] (2d ed.
1996).
20. Compare Colonial Times, Inc. v. Gasch, 509 F.2d 517, 521-22 (D.C. Cir. 1975) with
UAW v. National Caucus of Labor Comms., 525 F.2d 323, 326 (2d Cir. 1975). See also 4A
JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, 30.09[2] (2d ed. 1996).
21. See, e.g., Windsor Shirt Co. v. New Jersey Nat'l Bank, 793 F. Supp. 589, 607-11
(E.D. Pa. 1992), affd mem., 989 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1993); Bogan v. Northwestern Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 145 F.R.D. 642, 642-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
22. Since FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(d) permits depositions to "be taken... in the manner
provided in civil actions," the liberalization in the use of videotaped depositions brought
1996]
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Although the 1993 Amendments made videotaping a presumptively
appropriate method, Rule 30 still carries a series of safeguards to protect
against misuse. For example, it specifically proscribes distortion of the
"appearance or demeanor of deponents or attorneys"23 and requires the
officer to recite identifying information about the deposition at the start of
each new tape.24 Rule 30 also permits parties to designate another method
of recordation in addition to videotaping if they desire.25 Moreover, the
court retains discretion to bar the use of videotaping altogether.26
While the federal courts and numerous states 27 permit videotaped
depositions as a matter of course, i.e., absent stipulation or court order, the
current language 28 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure does not take
such a liberal view. Indeed, the main text of Rule 30 of the Arkansas Rules
of Civil Procedure makes no provision for videotaped depositions. Instead,
authority for taking depositions by videotape is secreted in Arkansas Rule
30(b)(4), which provides in pertinent part that "testimony at a deposition
[may] be recorded by other than stenographic means., 29 Technically, under
Rule 30(b)(4), a videotaped deposition (or any other non-stenographic
deposition) may be taken only by order of court. 3' By contrast, under the
Federal Rule, non-stenographic depositions may be taken "unless the court
orders otherwise.'
Practice in Arkansas frequently eschews the formality contemplated in
the Rules. Yet compliance with the Arkansas Rule requires the court order
to "designate the manner of recording, preserving and filing [of] the
about by the 1993 Amendments would apply also in the federal criminal law context. But
see text accompanying note 94 infra (describing general reluctance to use depositions in the
criminal court realm).
23. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(4).
24. Id.
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(3).
26. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(2).
27. See, e.g., Masinga v. Whittington, 792 S.W.2d 940, 940-41 (Tex. 1990) (to prevent
videotaping of deposition, party "must show particular, specific and demonstrable injury").
28. On November 13, 1995, the Supreme Court of Arkansas proposed to revise ARK.
R. Civ. P. 30 to make it equivalent to FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(2) and (3). See 322 Ark. Appx.
(delivered on November 13, 1995). If ultimately adopted, such changes will not take effect
until after September 1, 1996.
29. The Reporter's Notes to ARK. R. CIV. P. 30 do, however, provide "[w]here proper
safeguards are made, videotaped depositions are certainly proper." Cf Ark. Code Ann.
§ 16-44-203 (Michie 1994) (authorizing videotaped depositions of child victims in sexual
offense prosecutions).
30. Of course, ARK. R. Civ. P. 29 permits the parties to stipulate to modifications in the
discovery process so an actual court order can usually be averted. But see Transit Homes
v. Bellamy, 282 Ark. 453, 459-60, 671 S.W.2d 153, 157 (1984) (court retains power under
ARK. R. Civ. P. 29 to overrule or reject counsel's discovery-related stipulation).
31. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(2).
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deposition."32 Other provisions to encourage accuracy and trustworthiness
are optional yet encouraged.
In recent years, courts have freely granted parties leave to videotape
depositions. Nevertheless, practical considerations have sometimes led even
the federal courts to refuse.33 In still other cases, notwithstanding first
amendment and common law rights of access to court records and
documents, concerns over the possible non-litigation use of the videotaped
depositions have impelled courts to circumscribe access and use outside the
context of the case.' For example, in United States v. McDougal, 35 the trial
court properly refused to allow the press (and a political organization) to
duplicate the videotaped deposition of President Clinton, which had been
played at the trial. In spite of the strong presumption of public access
employed in the Second, Third, Seventh, and District of Columbia Circuit
Courts of Appeals,36 and the considerable public interest in the Whitewater
32. ARK. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(4).
33. See, e.g., Hiatt v. Mazda Motor Corp., No. LR-C-92-574, slip op. at 1-2 (E.D. Ark.
Jan. 21, 1994) (even in the wake of the 1993 Amendments to FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b), a request
to videotape a deposition of a non-English speaking employee was denied since the witness
planned to appear at trial, the request was somewhat untimely, and all normal advantages of
observing a witness firsthand would be lost due to use of interpreter and cultural differences);
Bogan v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 145 F.R.D. 642, 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (concern
over cross-conversations/interruptions in absence of stenographic back up); Bywaters v.
Bywaters, 123 F.R.D. 175, 176 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (telephonic deposition of plaintiffs expert
would not be videotaped since the defendant would necessarily be unable to see the expert's
physical reactions to questions posed during the deposition); Westmoreland v. CBS, 584 F.
Supp. 1206, 1212-13 (D.D.C. 1984) (privacy interest of non-party deponent may outweigh
party's interest in videotaping deposition), rev'd on other grounds, 770 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir.
1985). Likewise, some courts have granted one party leave to videotape an evidentiary
deposition on condition that the other parties may take a preceding discovery deposition. See
FDIC v. Deloitte & Touche, No. LR-C-90-520, slip op. at 4 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 18, 1992).
34. See, e.g., In re American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1168, 1172
(D.D.C. 1982) (press denied right to copy and broadcast videotaped deposition of actress
Jodie Foster in case involving prosecution of John Hinkley); Inhofe v. Wiseman, 772 P.2d
389, 393-94 (Okla. 1989) (prohibiting non-litigation use of state senator's videotaped
deposition due to concerns that political opponent would use it in media blitz). Cf. Ark.
Code Ann. § 16-44-203(d) (Michie 1944) (videotaped depositions of child victims of sexual
abuse subject to protective order to protect privacy).
35. See United States v. McDougal, No. LR-CR-95-173 (E.D. Ark. June 11, 1996),
affd, Nos. 96-2606 & 96-2671, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 2047 (8th Cir. Aug. 12, 1996) (per
curiam) (affirming district court decision).
36. See In re CBS, Inc., 828 F.2d 958, 959 (2d Cir. 1987) (right to inspect judicial
records extends to videotaped depositions); United States v. Guzzino, 766 F.2d 302, 304 (7th
Cir. 1985); United States v. Martin, 746 F.2d 964, 968 (3d Cir. 1984); In re National
Broadcasting Co., 653 F.2d 609, 618-21 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that trial court abused its
discretion in refusing to allow broadcaster to copy videotapes and audiotapes in criminal trial
of former congressman); United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 821-24 (3d Cir. 1981).
1996]
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prosecutions, the trial judge concluded that a variety of countervailing
interests militated against releasing the video for copying and rebroadcast.37
B. Who Runs the Camera?
While many attorneys employ independent operators to run the camera,
such is not necessarily required.3" In fact, the parties may stipulate that an
employee of the attorney's office, or even the attorney, may operate the
camera. This can yield considerable cost savings for the client.
C. Stenographic Transcription
When videotaping a deposition, most attorneys also employ a court
reporter to stenographically record it. Such stenographic backup is not
required by either the Federal or Arkansas Rules. 39 However, under both
37. The trial court found that release of the tape was unwarranted because the press
attended trial, because a written transcript was made available, because of the potential for
misuse, and because release could impede future attempts to obtain testimony from a
President.
38. See Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. S.E. Toyota Distrib., 114 F.R.D. 647, 651
(M.D.N.C. 1987) (independent operator of video camera not required; attorney for party may
run the equipment); 4A JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 30.10, at
30-117 (2nd ed. 1996). Cf. Colonial Times v. Gasch, 509 F.2d 517, 522 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(audiotape operator need not be independent of the parties); United States v. Hargro, 104
F.R.D. 451, 452 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (attorney authorized to operate audio recording device over
objection); Marlboro Prods. Corp. v. North Am. Phillips Corp., 55 F.R.D. 487, 489 (S.D.N.Y.
1972) (notwithstanding Rule 28(a), use of an independent audiotape operator would not be
required since such a blanket requirement would nullify the cost-savings objections behind
Rule 30 and because numerous safeguards against abuse exist). Contra Kallen v. Nexus
Corp., 54 F.R.D. 610, 613-14 (N.D. I11. 1972); see also Bogan v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 145 F.R.D. 642, 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (videotaping rejected due in part to concerns about
who would operate camera). Close adherence to the dictates of Rule 28 (disqualifying
persons having an interest in the proceedings from reporting depositions) seems necessary
in the context of stenographically-produced depositions, but little compelling justification
exists for such mandated "independence" in the context of video depositions. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 28(c). Whereas in the former situation, the stenographer by necessity must interpret
what the participants say before recording the information, no such need for interpretation
exists for the camera operator. Since no filtration or interpretation of the dialogue is
performed by the video operator, the prospects for bias or prejudice to influence the
preparation of the record are limited and, hence, the need for "independence" evaporates.
Any concerns over the possibility of improper camera angles, lighting or sound enhancement
can usually be easily alleviated through stipulation or monitoring.
39. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(2). Nevertheless, in the past, some federal courts required
simultaneous stenographic transcription as a condition of authorizing the videotaping. See,
e.g., Roberts v. Homelite Div. of Textron, 109 F.R.D. 664, 668 (N.D. Ind. 1986). Such
rulings seem to conflict with the intent of the rule. The 1993 amendments to the federal
rules do not require such simultaneous transcription, but if the video is to be used at trial or
[Vol. 18
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Rule 30(b)(4) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 30(b)(3)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any party has an absolute right to
have a stenographic transcription made. Such transcription must be prepared
at the expense of the party requesting it.
40
Since a stenographic backup is usually optional, a litigant may be able
to reduce costs, i.e., court reporter fees, by dispensing with a stenographic
backup. Such an approach particularly makes sense in the case of records
custodians' depositions when, once the documents are produced, a transcript
will often prove unnecessary since the parties can usually then stipulate to
the documents' authenticity. In many instances, however, having the written
transcript may prove necessary for trial preparation, for use in conjunction
with various motions, for making poster-board enlargements for use at trial,
and for seeking rulings on objections before the videotape is presented to a
jury.4
III. ADMISSIBILITY OF VIDEOTAPE AT TRIAL
A. Civil Cases
1. Videos as Demonstrative Evidence
From an evidentiary standpoint, the same rules applying to admission
of photographs or other related demonstrative evidence generally apply to
the admission of videos.42 Although courts sometimes ignore or confuse the
in conjunction with a summary judgment motion, the party seeking to use the video must
have a transcript made. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(B) and 32(c); see also Gillen v. Nissan
Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 156 F.R.D. 120, 122 (E.D. Penn. 1994) (quoting from Federal
Advisory Committee notes).
40. Under the federal rule, the court may order otherwise. See, e.g., Roberts, 109
F.R.D. at 668 (requiring the videotaping party to bear the cost of the stenographic backup);
Kiraly v. Berkel, Inc., 122 F.R.D. 186, 188 (E.D. Penn. 1988) (ordering stenographic
recording at defendant's expense). See also Milwaukee Concrete Studios, Ltd. v. Greeley
Ornamental Concrete Prods., Inc., 140 F.R.D. 373, 380 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (requiring party
noticing deposition to pay for stenographic backup). The recovery of video-related costs is
discussed infra part V.
41. For discussion of how the matter is handled under the 1993 amendments to FED. R.
Civ. P. 30 and 32, see supra note 39.
42. See Phiropoulos v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 908 S.W.2d 712, 714 (Mo. Ct. App.
1995). See also Williams v. State, 316 Ark. 694, 696, 874 S.W.2d 369, 370 (1994); Fisher
v. State, 7 Ark. App. 1, 4 n.1, 643 S.W.2d 571, 573 n.1 (1982) (videotapes and sound motion
picture films are admissible on the same basis as photographs). Because videos present more
opportunities for editing than do conventional photographs (and because they record sound
in addition to visuals), authenticating videotape may require a relatively more rigorous
analysis. Given the potential need to investigate the authenticity of the video, courts may
foreclose use at trial if disclosure is untimely. See, e.g., Saturn Mfg. v. Williams Patent
Crusher & Pulverizer Co., 713 F.2d 1347, 1357 (8th Cir. 1983).
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fact, two primary43 theories exist for meeting foundational prerequisites.
The two are contextually and procedurally different, yet both are equally
valid means for gaining admission. Under the first-the pictorial testimony
doctrine44--the proponent must lay a foundation by showing through a
competent witness45 that the video accurately and fairly represents that
which it purports to show.4 6 Such a foundation is appropriate when the
sponsoring witness is available to testify at trial that the images produced on
the video replicate what the witness saw at the time of recordation. Thus,
the video is offered to illustrate what the witness describes orally.
In a number of contexts, e.g., unmanned security monitoring, no such
witness actually views the event at the time of recordation 47 and, conse-
43. See United States v. Rembert, 863 F.2d 1023, 1026-28 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (describing
a third hybrid process for authenticating videotape of crime).
44. See 2 McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 214, at 17 (John W. Strong et al. eds., 4th ed.
1992). See also FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(1); ARK. R. EVID. 901(b)(1).
45. Notwithstanding dictum in W.W.C. Bingo v. Zwierzynski, 53 Ark. App. 288, 292-
94, 921 S.W.2d 954, 957-58 (1996), that could be construed to the contrary, unless there is
evidence that the tape has been edited or its accuracy otherwise is subject to serious
challenge, testimony from the actual camera operator or other technically trained witness
should not normally be required in order to authenticate the video.
46. See Saturn Mfg., Inc. v. Williams Patent Crusher & Pulverizer Co., 713 F.2d 1347,
1356-57 (8th Cir. 1983) (adequate foundation laid by witness who was present during
filming); Medite of New Mexico, Inc. v. NLRB, 72 F.3d 780, 787 (10th Cir. 1985)
(excluding video of picket line in NLRB action because tape had been edited); United States
v. Roach, 28 F.3d 729, 732-33 (8th Cir. 1994) (upholding admission in criminal prosecution
since foundation properly laid and no proof of editing or alteration); Large v. Board of
Managers, 623 So. 2d 1174, 1176-77 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993) (surveillance film property
authenticated); Freeland v. Baker, 422 S.E.2d 315, 315-16 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (upholding
admission of videotape of arthroscopic surgical procedure performed on plaintiff, including
surgeon's narration, because foundation properly laid and because surgeon established it as
a business record for purposes of hearsay concerns). Cf Wetherill v. University of Chicago,
565 F. Supp. 1553, 1561-62 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (photos of other person's injuries properly
admitted where proper foundation laid since photos were to be used for illustrative purposes).
But see W.W.C. Bingo v. Zwierzynski, 53 Ark. App. 288, 294, 921 S.W.2d 954, 958 (1996)
(upholding exclusion of videotapes in workers' compensation proceeding on authentication
grounds since it was unclear "who made the tapes, and, in fact, even the witness by whom
appellant sought to introduce the tapes was not sure who the people were who were on the
tapes"). While videotape authentication issues primarily arise in the context of their visual
content, the capacity for recording sound on videotape raises additional evidentiary concerns.
Obviously, narrations accompanying the visual images are subject to challenge on hearsay
grounds. See Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1329-30 (Or. 1978). But even
nonspeaking audio can trigger serious authentication issues. See, e.g., Abernathy v. Superior
Hardwoods, Inc., 704 F.2d 963, 968 (7th Cir. 1983) (defendant foreclosed from playing
videotape of logging operation with sound on since microphone was not placed where
plaintiff was located and reliability was therefore questioned).
47. Or, as in the case of fast moving action, a witness may see but be unable to
comprehend the critical aspects of the event at the time it occurs. However, when reviewed
later or when replayed in slow motion, action in the background, or a feature that was
somehow otherwise missed, may become manifest.
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quently, the pictorial testimony theory is inapposite. Notwithstanding the
lack of a human witness, common sense teaches us that the event captured
on film did in fact occur. This is where the second foundational theory
proves helpful. Under the "silent witness" doctrine, the film is offered as
substantive (as opposed to merely illustrative) evidence.48 The touchstone
for admissibility thus normally turns on the reliability of the filming process
rather than on whether any witness can vouch for the accuracy of the
video's contents.4
Trial lawyers (and sometimes courts) periodically confuse the two
categories of videographic evidence and muddle the respective foundational
elements by contending (or assuming) erroneously that elements of the
authentication litany required for one of the theories must also be proven
when the alternative theory is being invoked.5"
48. See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 214, at 15 (John W. Strong et al. eds., 4th ed.
1992). See also United States v. Gordon, 548 F.2d 743, 744 (8th Cir. 1977); Robinson v.
State, 621 So. 2d 389, 391-92 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993). FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9); ARK. R.
EVID. 901(b)(9).
49. One author notes that at least four different methods exist for authenticating a video
under the "silent witness" theory:
These include (1) "[t]estimony of a photographic expert who [has] determined that
the video tape had not been altered in any way and was not built-up or faked";
(2) testimony concerning the chain of custody with respect to the videotape; (3)
testimony concerning the checking and use of the video camera along with
adequate proof of the validity of the videotape process and its proper utilization
in the case at hand; or (4) testimony that the videotape evidence introduced at
trial was the same as what the witness had inspected immediately after the
videotape had been recorded. Of course, using these methods in combination,
along with any testimony by a percipient witness able to verify the fairness and
accuracy of at least some portion of the subject matter of the videotape evidence,
would tend to make a stronger showing.
Jordan S. Gruber, Foundation for Contemporaneous Videotape Evidence, in 16 AM. JUR.
PROOF OF FACTS 3d 493, 526-27 (1992) (quoting CHARLES C. SCOTT, 3 PHOTOGRAPHIC
EVIDENCE § 1297 (2d ed. Supp. 1991)) (footnotes omitted).
Absent legitimate concerns about fabrication, it should normally be unnecessary for
the proponent to pass a rigorous chain of custody analysis as a condition of authentication.
Nevertheless, in most cases sole reliance on one of these four "methods" provides insufficient
safeguards. As a general rule of thumb, authentication can be established if the sponsoring
witness can testify (I) that within the relevant time frame the camera was capable of
capturing the event in question, i.e., running and focused on the scene in question, and (2)
that the video has not been altered. If alteration has occurred (or if there are lapses between
frames) more detailed testimony will be required to establish the fidelity of the video. See,
e.g., Robinson v. State, 621 So. 2d 389, 391-92 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (video properly
admitted under silent witness theory despite existence of lapses between frames in
surveillance film).
50. See Mendite of New Mexico, Inc. v. NLRB, 72 F.3d 780, 787 (10th Cir. 1995)
(citing United States v. Roach, 28 F.3d. 729, 733 (8th Cir. 1994)); 29A AM. JUR. 2D
Evidence § 982 (1994). Likewise, some authorities over-simplify the authentication analysis
by implying that technical foundations regarding the equipment or methodology are
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The differences in the two theories become important when addressing
other points, such as the impact of editing or changed conditions. Courts
almost uniformly hold that the mere fact that the video has been edited5
does not render it inadmissible. 2 Likewise, courts often note that delays
between the date of the incident involved and the date of filming or even
some changes in conditions do not necessarily render the video
inadmissible.53 These are dangerous overstatements. While each of these
propositions is true when the video is being used purely as illustrative
evidence, the danger of such blanket statements becomes apparent when the
video is offered as substantive evidence. 4 Likewise, differences in the
evidentiary basis will affect whether the video may be reviewed during jury
deliberations. For example, if the video is merely illustrative evidence, then
it generally should not be provided to the jury; if it is substantive evidence,
irrelevant. See, e.g., Videotape Evidence in the Courts - 1985, 26 S. TEX. L.J. 453, 457
(1985).
51. Given advancements in digital editing, alteration of videotape evidence has been
made easier and less detectable. The pixels of individual frames (which normally run at
thirty per second) can be rearranged, thereby altering the frame. Digital editing permits such
editing to be accomplished without the signal degradation that is a telltale sign of
manipulation by conventional analog editing. Likewise, techniques exist to remove or to add
date/time displays, and thereby obfuscate the fact that the video has been edited. For an
excellent discussion of the editing process and the potential for alteration and fabrication, see
Jordan S. Gruber, Videotape Evidence, in 44 AM. JUR. TRIALS 171, §§ 16-29 (1992).
52. Pritchard v. Downie, 326 F.2d 323, 326 (8th Cir. 1964) (fact of editing goes to
weight of the evidence, not to admissibility); Pease Co. v. Local Union 1787, 393 N.E.2d
504, 506 (1978) (same); Millers Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Wichita Flour Mill Co., 257 F.2d 93, 100
(10th Cir. 1958) (same). See also Mercantile Bank v. Phillips, 260 Ark. 129, 138-39, 538
S.W.2d 277, 282 (1976) (mere fact that film was edited or spliced without unbiased
supervision does not render it inadmissible). Moreover, even the fact that the tape has been
electronically enhanced to overcome poor sound or picture quality does not render it
inadmissible if the process verifies the inherent reliability and fidelity of the final product.
See, e.g., English v. State, 422 S.E.2d 924, 924-25 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). But see Utley v.
Heckinger, 235 Ark. 780, 786-87, 362 S.W.2d 13, 17 (1962) (on retrial, portions of film that
appeared to distort actual conditions should not be played). However, other parties should
be permitted to inspect all out takes to determine whether editing is subject to challenge and
to offer any other portions of the film that had been deleted. Mercantile Bank, 260 Ark. at
138-39, 362 S.W.2d at 282. See also Hotchkiss v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 139 F.R.D. 313,
316 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (plaintiffs ordered to provide defendants with each video that they plan
to use at trial).
53. See Nash v. Stanley Magic Door, Inc., 863 S.W.2d 677, 681 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993);
Jones v. Halvorson-Berg, 847 P.2d 945, 950 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (admitting demonstration
video made ten years after incident held admissible since differences in circumstances
between incident and demonstration were brought out during witness examination).
54. For instance, in the former instance, the sponsoring witness is subject to cross
examination over the nature and extent of any changes and how they render the video
different from actual conditions; in the latter situation, since by definition no human witness
can attest to the conditions of the original scene, there is no basis for fruitful cross
examination.
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it may be given to the jury provided that the judge concludes that the jury
would not give it undue weight.55
Regardless of the foundational theory being used, in all cases the video
must be probative and assist the jury in understanding the facts of the case.5 6
Given the high impact inherent in videos,57 courts are particularly receptive
to claims of unfair prejudice.5
An amalgam of evidentiary issues arises when the proponent seeks to
use a video that is effectively a reenactment of the event at issue.5 9 In this
situation, the line between the video as illustrative evidence and the video
as substantive evidence tends to blur.60
55. See Commonwealth v. Foster, 624 A.2d 144, 148-52 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (jury
should not have been permitted to view video reenactment during deliberations).
56. See Beers v. Western Auto Supply Co., 646 S.W.2d 812, 815-16 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982); Phiropoulos v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 908 S.W.2d 712, 714 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995). See
also Reber v. General Motors Corp., 669 F. Supp. 717, 719 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (plaintiff
precluded from introducing video of truck cab because it would have been cumulative).
57. Brandt v. French, 638 F.2d 209, 212 (10th Cir. 1981) (admission of films must be
carefully scrutinized due to their highly persuasive nature); Balian v. General Motors, 296
A.2d 317, 322 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972) (due to "tremendous dramatic impact of
motion pictures," courts must be alert to fact that jurors may place "inordinate weight" on
them).
58. See Brewer v. Jeep Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1147, 1149 (W.D. Ark. 1982) (video of
crash demonstration inadmissible), aff'd, 724 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1983); Field v. Omaha
Standard, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 323, 333 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (film excluded because it was gory,
inflammatory and confusing), af'd mem., 732 F.2d 145 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 828
(1984). As a matter of strategy, omitting the gory details can be wise since it not only averts
evidentiary challenges, but also can actually increase the video's impact on the jury. As one
writer poignantly observed, "[u]nderstatement is far more effective because it allows jurors
to use their own imaginations to fill in gaps. That is why actors are taught to avoid the
obvious. Watching someone cry is far less interesting than watching someone trying hard
not to cry." Williams Bailey, Making the Most of Day-in-the-Life Films, 30 TRIAL 28, 30
(1994).
59. Fusco v. General Motors Corp., 11 F.3d 259, 263-64 (1st Cir. 1993) (simulation of
vehicle component failure excluded because dramatic effect of video would tend to override
juror's awareness that conditions during filming did not correspond to actual accident
conditions); Phiropoulos v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 908 S.W.2d 712, 714-15 (Mo. Ct. App.
1995) (reversing defense verdict since video reenactment was introduced without sufficient
proof that it was substantially similar to accident in question); Carter v. Missouri Pac. R.R.,
284 Ark. 278, 681 S.W.2d 314 (1984); Carr v. Suzuki Motor Co., 280 Ark. 1, 655 S.W.2d
364 (1983); Balian v. General Motors, 296 A.2d 317, 321-24 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1972). But see Crossley v. General Motors Corp., 33 F.3d 818, 821-22 (7th Cir. 1994)
(video of rollover test involving different model automobile admissible to illustrate scientific
principle in light of extensive limiting instructions that tape was not reenactment); Nash v.
Stanley Magic Door, Inc., 863 S.W.2d 677, 681 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (video deemed
admissible since defendant established that it was not a re-creation of accident); Potlatch
Corp. v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 321 Ark. 314, 326, 902 S.W.2d 217, 224 (1995) (video offered
as a demonstration, not as a reenactment).
60. See, e.g., Pierce v. State, 671 So. 2d 186, 188 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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2. Re-creations versus Demonstrations
Nestled within this evidentiary twilight zone lie many of the cases
involving accident videographics. The clear majority view is that videos
that represent attempted re-creations of an event require proof that the
essential facts depicted in the videos are "substantially similar"' to those of
the original event.62 However, when the video is offered strictly to
demonstrate general scientific or physical principles that underlie an expert's
opinion, the "substantial similarity" requirement disappears.63
In addressing the foundational prerequisites for such videos, courts have
often focused primarily on a nominal inquiry: whether the video should be
called a "re-creation" (or "simulation") of the underlying event versus a
"demonstration" of scientific or physical principles.6' In many instances this
simple binary analysis begs the question because no clear dividing line
exists between "demonstrations" and "re-creations., 65 In fact, such videos
are more appropriately viewed as falling along a continuum. Furthermore,
many videos that are used in conjunction with expert testimony cannot be
neatly compartmentalized within a single category.66
61. The exact meaning of the term "substantially similar" is oblique. Clearly, the
proponent need not prove "identical" conditions, see Carr v. Suzuki Motor Co., 280 Ark. 1,
3-4, 655 S.W.2d 364, 365 (1983), but there is a dearth of case law that illuminates precisely
how similar the conditions must be. Some courts have shown surprisingly little concern for
the degree of similarity that would be required before a re-creation is admitted. See, e.g.,
Jones v. Lingenfelder, 537 So. 2d 1275, 1277-78 (La. Ct. App. 1989). Others have intimated
that while facts that are not disputed should normally be reflected in the video, material facts
that are disputed by the parties need not be. See Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg, 81 F.3d 416,
424-25 (4th Cir. 1996).
62. See Hinkle, 81 F.3d at 424-25; Fusco, 11 F.3d at 263; Gilbert v. Cosco, Inc., 989
F.2d 399, 402 (10th Cir. 1993); Phiropoulos v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 908 S.W.2d 712, 713-
15 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Carter, 284 Ark. at 280, 680 S.W.2d at 711. See also Hale v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 756 F.2d 1322, 1332-33 (8th Cir. 1985). This principle rests
on the notion that, absent such similarity, the potential for the jury to be misled or "unable
to visualize an opposing viewpoint," is simply too great. Id. at 1333 (quoting Hinkle, 81
F.3d at 425).
63. See, e.g., Robinson v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 16 F.3d 1083, 1087 (10th Cir. 1994);
Nachtsheim v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 847 F.2d 1261, 1278-79 (7th Cir. 1988). See also
Livingston v. Isuzu Motors, Ltd., 910 F. Supp. 1473, 1493 (D. Mont. 1995) (substantial
similarity not required since videos were not intended as duplications of accident).
64. See, e.g., Pandit v. American Honda Motor Co., 82 F.3d 376, 382 (10th Cir. 1996).
Some courts have used the term "illumination" in lieu of "demonstration." See, e.g., Hinkle,
81 F.3d at 424-25.
65. See Gladhill v. General Motors Corp., 743 F.2d 1049, 1051-52 (4th Cir. 1984).
66. Gilbert v. Cosco, Inc., 989 F.2d 399, 403-04 (10th Cir. 1993). Thus, a video may
contain both evidence that is merely illustrative and evidence that is substantive. See also
Misener v. General Motors, 165 F.R.D. 105, 106-08 (D. Utah 1996).
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Litigants have actively promoted this oversimplified approach toward
categorization. Given the added foundational burdens associated with "re-
,,61creations, it is not surprising that proponents often describe their video as
a mere "demonstration," in an effort to evade heightened scrutiny.68 Some
courts have accepted the proponent's description, but nevertheless have
excluded the video because the demonstrations were "just similar
enough ... to confuse the jury . ,,69 Other courts have rejected the
proponent's description and recharacterized the video as a re-creation. A
good example of this latter approach is Carter v. Missouri Pacific
Railroad.70 There, the Supreme Court of Arkansas observed that the fact
that the party construes its video as merely a demonstration of scientific or
mechanical principles does not dictate that it is. Nor does such a representa-
tion ensure that, even in the wake of a cautionary instruction,7 the jury will
interpret it as such.
One court has characterized the "demonstration"/"re-creation" dicho-
tomy as "the difference between a jury believing that they are seeing a
repeat of the actual event and a jury understanding the they are seeing an
illustration of someone else's opinion of what happened."72 While such an
observation helps to focus the debate, it does not settle it. Even the most
inexperienced cross examiner should be able to establish at the very least
that the video constitutes the expert's opinion of what happened. Moreover,
many videos that are too short or abstract to be "re-creations" nevertheless
67. Some decisions have muddled the issue. See, e.g., Randall v. Warnaco, Inc., Hirsh-
Weis Div., 677 F.2d 1226, 1233-34 (8th Cir. 1982) (noting that "substantial similarity" must
be shown, but then inexplicably stating that "dissimilarities affect the weight of the evidence,
not its admissibility"). See also Champeau v. Fruehauf Corp., 814 F.2d 1271, 1278 (8th Cir.
1987) (quoting Randall).
68. See, e.g., Finchum v. Ford Motor Co., 57 F.3d 526, 530-31 (7th Cir. 1995);
Gladhill v. General Motors Corp., 743 F.2d 1049, 1051-52 (4th Cir. 1984); Carter v. Missouri
Pac. R.R., 284 Ark. 278, 280, 681 S.W.2d 314, 315 (1984); Edwards v. ATRO S.p.A., 891
F. Supp. 1085, 1087-88 (E.D.N.C. 1995). See also Four Corners Helicopters, Inc. v.
Turbomeca, S.A., 979 F.2d 1434, 1442 (10th Cir. 1992) (proponent unsuccessfully argued
both that video was merely a demonstration of physical principles and passed the substantial
similarity test).
69. Finchum, 57 F.3d at 530. Fusco v. General Motors Corp., I I F.3d 259, 264 (1st
Cir. 1993) (even if termed a "demonstration," the video should be excluded if it "is
sufficiently close in appearance to the original accident to create the risk of
misunderstanding").
70. 284 Ark. 278, 681 S.W.2d 314 (1984).
71. See Carter, 284 Ark. at 279-81, 681 S.W.2d at 315-16 (admission of film
constituted reversible error notwithstanding a trial court's limiting instruction). But see
Montag v. Honda Motor Co., 75 F.3d 1414, 1420 (10th Cir. 1996) (discussing limiting
instruction); Pandit v. American Honda Motor Co., 82 F.3d 376, 382 (10th Cir. 1996).
72. Datskow v. Teledyne Continental Motors, 826 F. Supp. 677, 686 (W.D.N.Y. 1993)
(emphasis in original). See also Hinkle, 81 F.3d at 425.
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have enough factual similarities to the actual event to stimulate juror
confusion.73  Limiting instructions 74 theoretically offer some protection
against confusion, but in light of the difficulty that courts have had in
grappling with this "demonstration"/"re-creation" distinction," it is
unrealistic to assume the average juror will fully appreciate the subtleties of
the distinction. Furthermore, as a practical matter it is doubtful that the
juror will actually remember such a distinction (or admonitions contained in
any limiting instruction) when, after what may be days or weeks of
intervening evidence, the juror finally enters the jury room to evaluate all
the evidence and decide the case. After all, the memory of a vivid
videographic depiction may outlast any recollection of the warning contained
in an oral limiting instruction.
If there is a true answer to the dilemma, it is clear that it does not lie
with continued reliance on the oversimplified "demonstration"/"re-creation"
dichotomy. While crafting a workable solution is beyond the scope of this
article, several points are noteworthy. First, no matter how they are
categorized, reconstruction videos can often facilitate the jury's fact-finding
process and consequently should not be automatically relegated to the status
of evidentiary pariahs. Second, concerns over the possibility that jurors
might be misled or confused must be tempered by the realization that
thorough cross examination can often serve as an effective counterweight.76
Third, in order for this counterweight to work, the cross examiner must be
given the right to conduct full and early discovery.77
73. See Finchum v. Ford Motor Co., 57 F.3d 526, 530 (7th Cir. 1995); Fusco v.
General Motors Corp., II F.3d 259, 264 (1st Cir. 1993). But see In re Air Crash Disaster,
86 F.3d 498, 539 (6th Cir. 1996) (admission of computer animation upheld despite similarity
to actual events).
74. For a set of representative limiting instructions used to caution juries, see Pandit,
82 F.3d at 381; Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg, 81 F.3d 416, 425 (4th Cir. 1996); Robinson
v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 16 F.3d 1083, 1086-87 (10th Cir. 1994). See also Saldana v. Wirtz
Cartage Co., 385 N.E.2d 664, 669-70 (Ill. 1978).
75. See, e.g., Hinkle, 81 F.3d at 425 ("there is a fine line between a 'recreation' and an
'illustration"'); Gilbert v. Cosco, Inc., 989 F.2d 399, 403 (10th Cir. 1993) ("sometimes the
distinction is not clear between tests that recreate an accident and tests that demonstrate
scientific principles...").
76. See Naylor v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 847 F.2d 1305, 1307 (8th Cir. 1988) (cross
examination would expose dissimilarities).
77. Some courts have not seemed to recognize the importance of pretrial discovery of
videos. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster, 86 F.3d at 359.
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3. Videotaped Depositions
The use of videotaped depositions in civil cases is essentially no
different from the use of stenographically recorded depositions." s If the
deposition is not of an adverse party,79 then absent stipulation, the deponent
must generally be unavailable within the meaning of Rule (32)(a)(3).8 ' Yet
unavailability cannot always guarantee admissibility. The proponent must
also overcome objections based on relevance or unfair prejudice. In some
cases the very fact that a video deposition can depict the deponent so vividly
may sow the seeds of inadmissibility.8
Just as an attorney might use blowups of critical deposition testimony
during closing arguments, the attorney should be free to play excerpts from
video depositions during summation.12 Although the video becomes part of
the record, it generally should not go into the jury room during delibera-
tions8 3
78. See King v. Westlake, 264 Ark. 555, 558, 572 S.W.2d 841, 843 (1978) (embracing
the presentation of medical witness testimony via videotaped deposition and recognizing that
"videotape is the best substitute" for live testimony). Note, however, some reported cases
show a curious prejudice against treating videotaped depositions the same as stenographic
depositions. See, e.g., Windsor Shirt Co. v. New Jersey Nat'l Bank, 793 F. Supp. 589, 606-
17 (E.D. Pa. 1992), affd mem., 989 F.2d 490 (3rd Cir. 1993).
79. See FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(2).
80. Thus, under both the federal and Arkansas court rules, to admit the deposition, the
court must find either that the witness is deceased, that the witness is out of the country or
greater than 100 miles from the courthouse (or under state rule, out of state), that the witness
is unable to attend because of age, illness, infirmity or imprisonment, that the witness's
attendance could not be procured via subpoena or that "exceptional circumstances" exist. See
Angelo v. Armstrong World Indus., 11 F.3d 957, 963 (10th Cir. 1993) (use of physician's
deposition denied because proponent failed to use sufficient efforts to enforce subpoena);
Dickmann v. Larson Bus Serv., No. C8-95-865, 1995 WL 711105, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App.
1995) (trial court erred in admitting videotaped deposition; voluntary departure on fishing trip
did not make him "unavailable"). But see Reber v. General Motors Corp., 669 F. Supp. 717,
720 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (video deposition of physician allowed even though witness
unexpectedly returned to within 100 miles of courthouse); Keil v. Eli Lilly & Co., 88 F.R.D.
296, 300-01 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (plaintiff could not unilaterally call expert live since parties
previously agreed to videotaped deposition, which had been edited to remove inadmissible
evidence).
81. See, e.g., Marsee v. United States Tobacco Co., 866 F.2d 319, 321-22 (10th Cir.
1989) (deponent's grim physical condition combined with low probative value of testimony
raised high likelihood that video would unfairly prejudice defendant). But see Walls v.
Armour Pharmaceutical Co., 832 F. Supp. 1505, 1508-10 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (admitting video
deposition of AIDS victim in wrongful death action against plasma manufacturer).
82. See Bannister v. Town of Noble, 812 F.2d 1265, 1271 (10th Cir. 1987) (no error
in permitting excerpt from previously-admitted physician's deposition during closing
argument); Newland v. State, 459 N.E.2d 384, 386 (Ind. 1984). See also Videotape Evidence
in the Courts - 1985, 26 S. TEX. L.J. 453, 464 (1985).
83. See United States v. Binder, 769 F.2d 595, 600-01 (9th Cir. 1985) (jury should not
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B. Criminal Cases
In the criminal law context, videos have been used extensively to
memorialize confessions84 or victim's statements, 5 to show crime scenes 6
have been allowed to replay videotaped testimony since it unduly emphasized one portion
of evidence). See also 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 217, at 29 (4th ed. 1992). But Cf
United States v. Sims, 719 F.2d 375, 379 (1 lth-Cir. 1983) (upholding trial court's decision
to replay audiotaped testimony), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1034 (1984); Davlin v. State, 313
Ark. 218, 220-23, 853 S.W.2d 882, 884-85 (1993) (victim's videotaped statement to police
admitted into evidence and therefore could be replayed to jury if requirements of ARK. CODE
ANN. § 16-89-125(e) followed).
84. See Hendricks v. Swenson, 456 F.2d 503, 504-07 (8th Cir. 1972); Paramore v. State,
229 So. 2d 855, 858-59 (Fla. 1969), vacated in part, 408 U.S. 935 (1972); see also Cox v.
State, 313 Ark. 184, 189, 853 S.W.2d 266, 268 (1993). But see 5 WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE
1001(2)[03], at 1001-34 to -35 (1996) (use of video to show that confessions were
voluntarily made "must be viewed with some skepticism" because they may not show what
went on immediately before the filming, such as coercion, requests for counsel, and
statements inconsistent with guilt).
85. See Davlin v. State, 313 Ark. 218, 853 S.W.2d 882 (1993); Grayson v. State, 611
So. 2d 422, 423-24 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992) (admitting video of victim's dying declaration).
But see Lowery v. Collins, 988 F.2d 1364, 1368-74 (5th Cir. 1993) (admission of videotaped
interview' of child violated defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights).
86. The Arkansas Supreme Court has frequently sanctioned the use of crime scene
videos. In Williams v. State, 316 Ark. 694, 874 S.W.2d 369 (1994), the Court sustained the
admission of a murder scene video that was filmed within thirty minutes of the detective's
arrival. Id. at 696-97, 874 S.W.2d at 369-70. The Court noted that the video showed the
crime scene and shed light on the violence done to the victim, including the nature and extent
of wounds, which was deemed relevant to proving the defendant's intent. Id. Footage
showing the coroner rolling the victim's body to investigate the wounds was deemed
inadmissible by the trial court. Id. at 696, 874 S.W.2d at 369. Other Arkansas decisions
have approved the use of crime scene videos. See Weger v. State, 315 Ark. 555, 559, 869
S.W.2d 688, 690 (1994); Cox v. State, 313 Ark. 184, 193, 853 S.W.2d 266, 270-71 (1993);
Hickson v. State, 312 Ark. 171, 176, 847 S.W.2d 691, 694-95 (1993) (video properly
authenticated through investigating officer's testimony that it accurately depicted what he saw
and would help the jury understand his testimony); Logan v. State, 299 Ark. 255, 259, 773
S.W.2d 419, 422 (1989) (silent walk-through tour of crime location admitted). But cf Taylor
v. State, 640 So. 2d 1127, 1135 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (crime scene video unduly
prejudicial since it panned to family photos and crucifix on wall). Arguments challenging
the cumulative nature of admitting both videos and photographs have not fared well on
appeal, particularly if the trial court has exercised some discretion in limiting their use. See,
e.g., Cox, 313 Ark. at 193, 853 S.W.2d at 271; Hickson, 312 Ark. at 176, 847 S.W.2d at 694-
95 (trial court foreclosed use of some portions of video and barred audio replay).
Periodically, defendants have sought to introduce crime scene videos to dispute officer's
credibility over ability to observe certain events. See, e.g., State v. Richardson, 838 S.W.2d
.122, 124-25 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Jones, 298 So. 2d 774, 776 (La. 1974) (trial court
erred in excluding film showing visibility in negligent homicide case). For an extensive
discussion of the use of crime scene videos, see Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Admissibility
in Homicide Prosecution of Allegedly Gruesome or Inflammatory Visual Recordings of Crime
Scene, 37 A.L.R. 5TH 515 (1996).
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or to depict criminal activity that has been captured on film.87 Where the
filming is adventitious, admissibility may not face serious challenge so long
as basic foundational prerequisites outlined above8 are met. 9 Admissibility
faces greater scrutiny if the video is the product of premeditated surveillance
or monitoring, when the motivation and opportunities for manipulation
increase.90 The dangers of manipulation grow even greater when videos are
used as crime scene reenactments, 9' particularly if the videos use an actor
87. United States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2d 34, 43 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 835
(1982) (use of videotapes of criminal activity in course of Abscam investigation appropriate
since they can often serve as the only means of uncovering crime); United States v. Brager,
455 F.2d 217, 218 (8th Cir. 1972) (surveillance films of bank robbery admitted); Hoback v.
State, 286 Ark. 153, 156-57, 689 S.W.2d 569, 571 (1985) (video of drug transaction);
Walker v. State, 13 Ark. App. 124, 129-30, 680 S.W.2d 915, 919 (1984) (video of
accomplice selling stolen truck to undercover officer); Fisher v. State, 7 Ark. App. 1, 6, 643
S.W.2d 571, 574 (1982) (upholding admission of surveillance video from grocery store);
French v. State, 271 Ark. 445, 446, 609 S.W.2d 42, 43 (1980) (video of crime filmed by
defendant). But see Haltiwanger v. State, 322 Ark. 764, 766-67, 912 S.W.2d 418, 420 (1995)
(barring defendant's use of videos of similar robberies committed while defendant was
incarcerated on relevancy grounds; no sufficient proffer made to facilitate appellate review).
88. See supra text accompanying notes 44 through 46. Unmanned surveillance films
pose special but not insurmountable issues as to authentication since, by definition, no
witness could testify that the video footage correctly depicts what occurred at the scene.
Although the pictorial testimony theory of admissibility is inapplicable, courts have
nevertheless permitted authentication under the silent witness theory, under which the film
is deemed to be substantive evidence that speaks for itself. See Fisher v. State, 7 Ark. App.
1, 6-8, 643 S.W.2d 571, 574-76 (1982).
89. Williams v. State, 316 Ark. 694, 696, 874 S.W.2d 369, 370 (1994) (same
requirements for admissibility apply to both photographs and videotapes; video of crime
scene deemed probative and admissible despite arguably gruesome nature); Weger v. State,
315 Ark. 555, 560, 869 S.W.2d 688, 691 (1994); Hickson v. State, 312 Ark. 171, 176, 847
S.W.2d 691, 694-95 (1993) (trial court properly admitted crime scene video after foreclosing
use of audio portions of tape; alleged cumulative nature of tape deemed insufficient basis for
exclusion); United States v. Bynum, 567 F.2d 1167, 1171 (lst Cir. 1978) (video of crime
detected by surveillance camera deemed admissible).
90. See United States v. Roach, 28 F.3d 729, 733 (8th Cir. 1994) (affirming under plain
error standard admission of surveillance video showing defendant's purchase of chemicals/
equipment necessary for manufacture of methamphetamine); Fisher v. State, 7 Ark. App. 1,
5-6, 643 S.W.2d 571, 573-74 (1982) (authenticity of crime surveillance film established
through store owner's testimony as to positioning of camera, loading of videotape, starting
of filming, return, cessation of filming, changing of film, and continuous custody of video
thereafter).
91. See People v. McClary, 571 P.2d 620, 626-27 (1977), overruled on other grounds,
853 P.2d 1037, 1059 (Cal. 1993); Note, Manufacturing Evidence for Trial: The Prejudicial
Implications of Videotaped Crime Scene Enactments, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 2125 (1994). But
see Loy v. State, 310 Ark. 33, 36-37, 832 S.W.2d 499, 501 (1992) (upholding admission of
videotaped reenactment of bomb detonation; though simulated bomb was not identical to
original, it was substantially similar, which "is all the law requires for an admissible
reenactment of an original happening").
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to play the part of the defendant.92 As in the civil arena, criminal court
litigants have attempted to defuse concerns over the dangers of manipulation
by characterizing their videos as demonstrative rather than substantive
evidence.93 While such characterizations carry some facile appeal, the fact
that most jurors will not appreciate the difference at the time the video is
played (or remember the difference after all proof has been offered and
deliberations begin) counsels in favor of heightened judicial scrutiny.
Due in part to the fact that depositions historically have been disfavored
in the criminal law context,94 the use of videotaped depositions in criminal
cases is more closely scrutinized. Notwithstanding the traditional antipathy
toward use of depositions, most states have statutorily authorized courts to
admit videographic testimony from child sexual abuse victims.95
Like similar statutes from other states, Arkansas Code Annotated
section 16-44-203 is designed to insulate children from the pressures and
concomitant psychological trauma associated with confronting the alleged
abuser in the court room. Prosecutors have often taken advantage of the
statute and, consequently, numerous Arkansas criminal cases have involved
videotaped testimony from child sexual abuse victims. 96  The Arkansas
Supreme Court has required strict adherence to the procedural dictates of
Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-44-203, 9' in order to permit introduc
92. See 3 Charles C. Scott, PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE § 1329.5 (2d ed. Supp. 1994).
93. See Pierce v. State, 671 So. 2d 186, 189-91 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (computer
animation of accident reconstruction introduced as demonstrative evidence only).
94. See Misskelley v. State, 323 Ark. 449, 472-73, 915 S.W.2d 702, 714 (1996);
Cogburn v. State, 292 Ark. 564, 567-69, 732 S.W.2d 807, 808-09 (1987); McGuire v. State,
288 Ark. 388, 393, 706 S.W.2d 360, 362 (1986). See also United States v. Armstrong, 116
S. Ct. 1480, 1485 (1996) (narrowly interpreting Rule 16(a)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to permit discovery of information that defendant can use as a shield, not as
a sword).
95. See C. Alan Gauldin, Note, McGuire v. State: Arkansas Child Abuse Videotape
Deposition Laws-Room for Improvement, 41 ARK. L. REV. 155, 156-57 & nn. 11, 12 (1988)
(citing statutes).
96. See, e.g., Richard v. State, 306 Ark. 543, 815 S.W.2d 941 (1991) (overruling
objection to videotaped testimony of four year, ten month old rape victim). But see Russell
v. State, 269 Ark. 44, 46, 598 S.W.2d 96, 97 (1980) (prosecution's use of videotaped
deposition deemed reversible error since, under then applicable statute, ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 43-2011 (1977), only defendant had right to take deposition in a criminal case). Act 1022
of 1979, codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-44-201 & 202, amended ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-
2011 and has rendered Russell of primarily historical interest only.
97. The statute applies only to testimony by sexual abuse victims under seventeen years
of age. It requires that the deposition be videotaped before the judge in chambers and in the
presence of the prosecuting attorney, the defense attorney and the defendant. See Cogburn
v. State, 292 Ark. 564, 569, 732 S.W.2d 807, 809 (1987) (ruling that ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 43-2036, later codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-44-203, controls and Rule 803(25) of the
Arkansas Rules of Evidence does not apply; consequently, admission of videotape of child
ruled prejudicial error); State v. Lee, 277 Ark. 142, 143-44, 639 S.W.2d 745, 746-47 (1982)
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tion of a child's videotape. However, the court has rather broadly construed
the more substantive "good cause" requirement98 and has repelled challenges
based on the vagueness of the term99 and on the quality and quantity of the
proof necessary to meet that requirement) °°
While Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-44-203 is a tool solely for
the use by the prosecution, Arkansas criminal defendants may take
advantage of the video medium through the generic criminal court
deposition statutes, Arkansas Code sections 16-44-201 to 202.°10 Moreover,
a defendant in a capital murder case can exploit the virtues of video by
using videotapes to present mitigating evidence free from most admissibility
constraints so long as the video evidence is relevant to the issue of
punishment and the film appears free from manipulative editing.1
0 2
(under previous version of statute, if prosecution commenced deposition and witness balked
at testifying, prosecution could not thereafter call that witness live at trial). Cf Davlin v.
State, 313 Ark. 218, 220-23, 853 S.W.2d 882, 884-86 (1993) (reversing conviction because
victim's videotaped statement was replayed to jury in jury room outside defendant's
presence).
98. The "good cause" requirement is most often established through proof that, due to
the victim's tender age and/or emotional state, the child would suffer if required to testify
in person at trial. See, e.g., Greenlee v. State, 318 Ark. 191, 198, 884 S.W.2d 947, 950
(1994); Cope v. State, 293 Ark. 524, 528-29, 739 S.W.2d 533, 535 (1987). But see Chappell
v. State, 18 Ark. App. 26, 33, 710 S.W.2d 214, 217 (1986) (expert testimony not required
to establish "good cause"). Cf United States v. Boyles, 57 F.3d 535, 546 (7th Cir. 1995)
(expert testimony presented before deciding to allow videotaping of testimony).
99. McGuire v. State, 288 Ark. 388, 394, 706 S.W.2d 360, 363 (1986). In contrast to
the imprecise "good cause" requirements, some states have implemented more definitive
standards. See, e.g., MARYLAND CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (1995) (before
authorizing closed-circuit testimony, court must determine that "testimony by the child victim
in the defendant's presence will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress such
that the child cannot reasonably communicate").
100. See Kester v. State, 303 Ark. 303, 306-07, 797 S.W.2d 704, 705-06 (1990) (good
cause supported through letter from "psychiatric social worker" that live testimony would be
"emotionally upsetting" to 11-year old witness; the inability to cross examine letter's author
deemed unavailing to defendant); Greenlee v. State, 318 Ark. 191, 198, 884 S.W.2d 947, 950
(1994) (sole reliance on testimony of witness' mother deemed sufficient to establish good
cause); Cope v. State, 293 Ark. 524, 528-29, 739 S.W.2d 533, 535 (1989) (upholding use of
videotaped depositions of child victims); McGuire v. State, 288 Ark. 388, 394, 706 S.W.2d
360, 363 (1986) (grandparents' testimony that child could be harmed if forced to testify in
court deemed sufficient to establish good cause); Chappell v. State, 18 Ark. App. 26, 710
S.W.2d 214 (1986). See also, Steven M. Ramanoff, Comment, The Use of Closed-Circuit
Television Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: A Twentieth Century Solution to a
Twentieth Century Problem, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 919 (1986); Note, The Testimony of
Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecution: Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HARV. L. REV. 806,
813-16 (1985) (providing discussion of various states' videotaping statutes).
101. See Berna v. State, 282 Ark. 563, 569, 670 S.W.2d 434, 438 (1984) (authorizing
defendant to take expert's videotaped deposition at government expense), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1085 (1985).
102. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-602(4). In light of amendments to section 602(4), a
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In the federal courts, subject to the "exceptional circumstances"
requirements of Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
availability of videotaping as a recordation medium is treated essentially in
the same way as under Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,10 3
although, as with criminal court depositions in general, actual use at trial is
comparatively more restricted."'° Furthermore, consistent with the dictates
of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, the defendant should
normally be permitted to be present at the taping.0 5
resourceful prosecutor might use videotapes to present victim impact evidence at the
sentencing phase of a capital murder trial. Cf. Ruiz v. Norris, 868 F. Supp. 1471, 1517-21
nn. 9-10 (E.D. Ark. 1994), affd, 71 F.3d 1404 (8th Cir 1995) (discussing use of victim
impact evidence), petition for cert. filed, May 28, 1996. See also State v. Mease, 842
S.W.2d 98, 108-09 (Mo. 1992) (upholding use of video of crime scene during penalty phase),
cert. denied, 508 U.S. 918 (1993).
103. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(d) (deposition "shall be taken and filed in the manner
provided in civil actions" however, as with all depositions in federal criminal court, the court
retains authority to impose "additional conditions"). The federal courts have permitted
videotaping where, for example, economic realities make it cheaper for counsel to travel to
the witnesses' location than to bring witnesses to court. United States v. Laymon, 127
F.R.D. 534, 536 (D. Colo. 1989). A similar situation arises when a witness would not likely
be available for trial due to incarceration elsewhere. United States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 605
F. Supp. 190, 192-93 (D.P.R. 1985).
104. See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Riley, 754 F. Supp. 61, 63-64 (D.V.I.
1991) (comparing Rule 15(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure with Rule 32(a) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3503 (1995 & Supp. 1996). See also
United States v. Grooms, 978 F.2d 425, 429 (8th Cir. 1992).
105. Compare United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815, 821-22 (8th Cir. 1979)
(videotaped deposition violated defendant's confrontation rights since he was kept outside
the vision of the witness) with United States v. Terrazas-Montano, 747 F.2d 467, 469-70 (8th
Cir. 1984) (video depositions deemed appropriate because the defendant faced the witness).
Cf. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1022 (1988) (Confrontation Clause violated by Iowa statute
that permitted accuser to testify from behind screen which blocked view of defendant). But
cf Johnson v. Lockhart, 71 F.3d 319, 320-21 (8th Cir. 1995) (Confrontation Clause not
violated by physician's testimony about child's out-of-court statements if child is subject to
cross examination at trial). See also, Tammera L. Rankin, Note, Evidence-The Confrontation
Clause-A Literal Right to a Face-to-Face Meeting, 11 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 591 (1988-
89) (discussing Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988)). The Confrontation Clause does not
require the accuser to "fix his eyes upon the defendant." Coy, 487 U.S. at 1019. Moreover,
as noted in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990), the right to confrontation does not
necessarily require face-to-face confrontations in every case, at least if compelling interests
counsel otherwise. Id. at 847. Congress has statutorily embraced this concept in the context
of deposition testimony by child sexual abuse victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b)(2) (Supp. 1996).
See United States v. Boyles, 57 F.3d 535, 545-46 (7th Cir. 1995) (trial court must find that
video deposition is necessary to protect child's welfare; that child would be traumatized by
defendant's presence; and that such trauma is more than mere nervousness, excitement or
reluctance to testify). To the extent that the principles underlying the Confrontation Clause
encourage not only face-to-face meetings between the witness and the defendant, but also full
observation of the witness by the jury, video depositions are far preferable to
stenographically-transcribed depositions. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).
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C. Playback at Trial
Most seasoned trial attorneys recognize that, notwithstanding the virtues
of the videotape medium, an inverse relationship exists between the video's
length and its persuasiveness. After fifteen or twenty minutes, jurors' minds
tend to wander."°6 Consequently, brevity should remain a foremost objective
of the proponent. Yet, at times, interpreting a video requires close and
repetitive scrutiny. In certain circumstances, any party may seek to stop the
video at a particular frame,"°7 play it in slow motion, or even play it in
reverse.10 8 Moreover, on occasion, courts have permitted parties to furnish
the jury with a transcript of the video's audio portions."0
IV. SURVEILLANCE FILMS AND DAY-IN-THE-LIFE DOCUMENTARIES
Defense attorneys have long used surveillance videos to depict
claimants engaged in daily physical activities. Such videos can be used to
attack the plaintiffs credibility by providing hard evidence that asserted
limitations on physical or mental activities are exaggerations, if not blatant
lies."0 The surveillance film can also provide the jury with substantive
evidence of the claimant's less-than-bleak daily life and thereby drastically
Yet, video depositions hardly can be deemed truly equivalent to in-person testimony. If, as
intimated in Coy, the jury should be permitted to "draw its own conclusions" from the
accuser's refusal to look the defendant in the eye, then a defendant loses some of the benefits
of the Confrontation Clause if the camera angle fails to depict that which would be observed
by the jury if testimony were presented in the courtroom. See Coy, 487 U.S. at 1019.
106. See Steven W. Quattlebaum, Effective Video Presentations at Trial: Put on a Good
Show, But Cut to the Chase (Part II), ARK. LAW., Summer 1993, at 56, 63 (1993).
107. State v. Borden, 455 N.W.2d 482 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); English v. State, 422
S.E.2d 924, 925 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (computer-enhanced copy of individual frame from
videotape properly admitted). But see Commonwealth v. Hindi, 631 A.2d 1341, 1344-46 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1993) (defendant precluded from showing video in slow motion when he had been
permitted to play it at regular speed and use still photographs).
108. See Scott v. State, 390 N.W.2d 889 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
109. See United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214, 1237-39 (11th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 480 U.S. 919 (1987); United States v. Llinas, 603 F.2d 506, 509-10 (5th Cir. 1979).
But see State v. Reyes, 704 P.2d 261, 263 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (transcript properly barred).
110. See, e.g., National Bank of Commerce v. McNeill Trucking Co., 309 Ark. 80, 84,
86-87, 828 S.W.2d 584, 586-87 (1992); Guillot v. Miller, 580 So. 2d 1104, 1107 (La. Ct.
App. 1991); McGoorty v. Benhart, 27 N.E.2d 289, 293-96 (I11. App. Ct. 1940).
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curtail damages."' Alternatively, the surveillance film may provide
ammunition for a failure-to-mitigate-damages defense." 2
Although serious distortions in sequencing, lighting, or speed can give
rise to admissibility problems" 3 as noted in Ponder v. Cartmell,"14 the fact
that a surveillance film may depict only a selected portion of a few days in
the plaintiffs life goes to the weight of the evidence, not to its
admissibility." 5 Similarly, the fact that the video is filmed "covertly rather
than openly is immaterial.""' 6 Given the extensive track record of surveil-
lance videos, courts have employed a number of tests for establishing the
requisite foundation." 7
Normally characterized as an innovation of the plaintiffs bar, the day-
in-the-life documentary is, in one sense, merely an offensive adaptation of
the surveillance video. Both purportedly share the same fundamental
objective: to portray the plaintiff in his natural routine.
Notwithstanding the similarity in overall purpose, the two types of
presentations differ in three fundamental respects. First, in the day-in-the-
life film the subject of the video is normally fully aware of the filming and
may therefore exaggerate expressions or limitations," 8 whereas in surveil-
lance videos the surreptitious nature of the filming removes the potential for
acting by the claimant."9 Second, the potential for pre-film rehearsal, sound
111. See, e.g., Simons v. State Compensation Mut. Ins. Fund, 865 P.2d 1118, 1122
(Mont. 1993) (surveillance video was offered for substantive proof, not to impeach
credibility). Most surveillance videos contain both impeachment and substantive evidence.
See also Shushereba v. R.B. Indus., Inc., 104 F.R.D. 524, 531-32 (W.D. Pa. 1985)
(surveillance film properly used both to impeach credibility and to refute plaintiffs
contention that he cannot return to work).
112. See, e.g., Marion County v. Cavanaugh, 577 So. 2d 599, 600 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1991) (surveillance film should have been admitted inter alia to show that plaintiff was doing
physical work harmful to his back in violation of doctor's orders).
113. See Utley v. Heckinger, 235 Ark. 780, 786-87, 362 S.W.2d 13, 17 (1962) (portions
of film should be deleted instead of simply giving jury instruction to ignore); Blanchard v.
Means Indus., Inc., 635 So. 2d 288, 294 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (surveillance video barred
because it was not timed, film portions ran together, and it lacked significant impeachment
value).
114. 301 Ark. 409, 784 S.W.2d 758 (1990).
115. Id. at 413, 784 S.W.2d at 761.
116. See Carney v. Smith, 608 N.E.2d 379, 383 (I11. App. Ct. 1992).
117. See Jordan S. Gruber, Foundation for Contemporaneous Videotape Evidence, 16
AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 493 (1992).
118. Bannister v. City of Noble, Oklahoma, 812 F.2d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1987). See
also Marion County v. Cavanaugh, 577 So. 2d 599 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (overturning
trial court's exclusion of thirty minute surveillance tape; fact that tape was a distillation of
forty-four hours of footage did not render it inadmissible).
119. See Douglas A. Graham & Daryl J. Lapp, Day-in-the-Life Videos: Evolving
Arguments on their Making and Use at Trial, 27 TORT & INS. L.J. 574, 591 (1992)
(observing that, by their very nature, "day-in-the-life films involve a staged or packaged
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enhancement, or multiple takes to "get it right" always exists with the
filming of day-in-the-life videos,12° whereas the surveillance videographer
usually labors under the handicaps of poor camera angles, bad lighting or
atmospheric conditions and frequently, though unintentionally, uncooperative
subjects. 2 ' Thus the potential for manipulation--though not entirely absent
in surveillance videos' 22-is comparatively greater in day-in-the-life films.
Third, whereas surveillance films are most often used to portray the claimant
in a single act that belies his professed disabilities, the day-in-the-life film
is offered as a summary of a typical day. 23
A. Admissibility of Day-in-the-Life Videos
The potential for manipulation and exaggeration creates a welter of
issues both as to admissibility and discovery. When day-in-the-life videos
were a relatively new phenomenon, courts were particularly responsive to
presentation of facts, whereas a surveillance film involves a recording of unrehearsed fact").
See also Egelhoff v. Holt, 875 S.W.2d 543, 550 (Mo. 1994) (surveillance film deemed highly
relevant since it is the next best thing to allowing jury to observe plaintiffs movements at
a time when she is unaware of being observed).
120. For an analysis of the various types of manipulative techniques that are available
when day-in-the-life videos are filmed, see Monty L. Preiser & Mark L. Hoffman, Day-in-
the-Life Films-Coming of Age in the Courtroom (pt. 1), 17 TRIAL 26, 29-30 (1981) and
Charles W. German et al., Videotape Evidence at Trial, 6 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 209, 210,
215-18, 224-26 (1982).
121. But see Maryland Casualty Co. v. Coker, 118 F.2d 43, 44 (5th Cir. 1941) (upholding
admission of surveillance film though defendant staged the event by inviting plaintiff to party
complete with plenty of liquor and female companions).
122. See Snead v. American Export-Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 148, 150 (E.D. Pa.
1973) (observing that in surveillance films, "the camera may be an instrument of
deception.... Distances may be minimized or exaggerated. Lighting, focal lengths, and
camera angles all make a difference. Action may be slowed down or speeded up. The
editing and splicing of films may change the chronology of events."); Jenkins v. Rainner, 350
A.2d 473 (N.J. 1976).
123. This gives rise to numerous evidentiary issues. The first stems from the fact that
the term "day-in-the-life" is a misnomer because neither is the film a day in length, nor is
it necessarily representative of the witness's life. Seen in this light, the day-in-the-life
documentary is at best merely a summary of a day in the plaintiffs life. Yet whereas with
the presentation of conventional summaries, the party against whom the summary is offered
typically must be given the opportunity to examine all components that lead to preparation
of the summary (see FED. R. EVID. 1006; ARK. R. EvID. 1006), a party opposing introduction
of a day-in-the-life film normally has no access to the "rest of the day" that has not been
depicted in the final product or in related out takes.
In a similar vein, it is noteworthy that the true purpose of the film is not to present
merely one day in the plaintiffs life, but rather to portray the plaintiff's life through the
filming of a purportedly typical day. Again, the defense attorney normally lacks access to
the proof that she would normally be afforded if the summary being offered were work
papers, computer records, or photographs.
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defense arguments against admissibility. In one leading case, Thomas v.
C.G. Tate Constr. Co.,2 4 the plaintiff sought to introduce a video that
graphically depicted a rigorous, twenty-seven minute physical therapy
session. Citing video footage that showed the plaintiff in extreme pain and
anguish, the court observed that the film's inflammatory nature would surely
incite sympathy for the plaintiff.'25 The court also pointed out that there
was "no way in which the defendant can possibly depict with equal impact
those periods of time during the plaintiff's recovery process when he was
either free of pain or relatively speaking, free of pain."' 26 Finding it unduly
prejudicial, the court barred the use of the video at trial.'27
Such analysis typifies the reluctance with which trial courts have often
viewed such evidence.' Defense counsel therefore most frequently raise
the specter of unfair prejudice when challenging admission of day-in-the-life
videos. But such is not the only hurdle the plaintiffs attorney must
overcome.
By definition, a day-in-the-life documentary is problematic. The
underlying concept is that the video accurately portrays a "typical" day
when, in fact, there may be no such thing. Thus, concerns expressed in
Thomas'29 over the defendant's relative lack of access to proof deserve
reflection. 3 0 While virtually the same problem arises with all evidence that
is not equally accessible to all parties, a real danger posed by the admission
of day-in-the-life videos stems from the lack of any practical restraint on
how the jury will use the information contained therein. In short, despite
124. 465 F. Supp. 566 (D.S.C. 1979).
125. Id. at 569.
126. Id. at 571. See also supra note 123.
127. Thomas, 465 F. Supp. at 571. Part of the court's rationale--the relative novelty of
using videotape technology in the courtroom--is now obsolete.
128. See also Haley v. Byers Transp. Co., 414 S.W.2d 777, 780-81 (Mo. 1967); Butler
v. Chrestman, 264 So. 2d 812, 816 (Miss. 1972); Transit Homes v. Bellamy, 282 Ark. 453,
462, 671 S.W.2d 153, 158-59 (1984) (day-in-the-life film should not have been shown to jury
since it was impossible to distinguish limitations that were linked to accident from those that
preexisted accident). But see Elk Corp. v. Jackson, 291 Ark. 448, 457, 725 S.W.2d 829, 834
(1987) (appellant failed to demonstrate how day-in-the-life tape was inadmissible).
129. Thomas v. C.G. Tate Constr. Co., 465 F. Supp. 566, 571 (D.S.C. 1979). See also
Foster v. Crawford Shipping Co., 496 F.2d 788, 791-93 (3d Cir. 1974) (ex parte nature of
filming unduly prejudiced defendant).
130. Some courts have reasoned that the plaintiff's availability for cross-examination at
trial mitigates the dangers of prejudice. See DeBiasio v. Illinois Central R.R., 52 F.3d 678,
687 (7th Cir. 1995), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 1040 (1996); Bannister v. Town of Noble, 812
F.2d 1265, 1270 (10th Cir. 1987). But this overlooks the fact that the lag time between
filming and cross-examination at trial understandably may dull the plaintiffs memory,
thereby giving the plaintiff (or any other attesting witness) an easy way to avoid effective
cross-examination.
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a judge's limiting instruction,13' the potential exists that jurors may view that
which is supposed to be mere illustrative evidence as substantive
evidence. 32 Moreover, jurors may unconsciously fill in gaps in the proof
with whatever happens to be shown in the video.
33
Efforts to use day-in-the-life videos have been challenged on grounds
that they constitute hearsay, 34 that they are cumulative, 35 that they are
131. Cf Carter v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 284 Ark. 278, 279-81, 681 S.W.2d 314, 315 (1984)
(despite limiting instruction and representation that film was not offered as a "re-creation,"
film of accident scene was a re-creation and therefore was inadmissible because essential
elements were not "substantially similar" to actual situation).
132. See Foster v. Crawford Shipping Co., 496 F.2d 788, 791-92 (3d Cir. 1974) (video
of plaintiff used not merely for illustrative purposes, but also as substantive evidence to
establish plaintiff's medical condition).
133. Cf King v. Copp Trucking, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 304, 309 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (video
of experiment excluded because jury may be inclined to fill in "unascertainable facts" with
circumstances portrayed in video).
134. See Grimes v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 73 F.R.D. 607, 610-11 (D. Alaska
1977) (although hearsay, film deemed admissible under the residual exception of Rule
803(24)); But see Haley v. Byers Transp. Co., 414 S.W.2d 777, 780 (Mo. 1967); see also
Foster v. Crawford Shipping Co., 496 F.2d 788, 791 (3d. Cir. 1974); Sprynczynatyk v.
General Motors Corp., 771 F.2d 1112, 1117 (8th Cir. 1985) ("In general a videotape offered
to prove the truth of the matter asserted constitutes inadmissible hearsay."), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1046 (1986). Certainly, hearsay challenges are inevitable if the tape contains narrative
and such challenges will normally succeed if the narrator is unavailable for cross-examination
at trial. Cf Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1329-30 (Or. 1978). Yet even
nonverbal conduct may trigger hearsay objections if it can be construed as a nonverbal
assertion. But see Strach v. St. John Hosp. Corp., 408 N.W.2d 441, 453 (Mich. Ct. App.
1987) (admitting video despite some unfairly prejudicial portions and rejecting hearsay
challenge).
135. See Bolstridge v. Central Main Power Co., 621 F. Supp. 1202, 1204 (D. Me. 1985)
(video deemed cumulative of oral testimony and in-court demonstrations); Ashley v. Nissan
Motor Corp., 321 So. 2d 868, 872-73 (La. Ct. App. 1975) (film of plaintiff in hospital
deemed cumulative of fourteen still photographs). See also Repple v. Barnes Hosp., 778
S.W.2d 819, 823 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (excluding video since plaintiff appeared at trial and
was able to demonstrate daily activities through conventional testimony); Helm v. Wismar,
820 S.W.2d 495, 497 (Mo. 1991); J. B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE 1001(2)[103], at 1001-43 (1993) (describing need for heightened scrutiny as to
the cumulative nature of videos). But see Elk Corp. v. Jackson, 291 Ark. 448, 457, 725
S.W.2d 829, 834 (1987) (trial court's admission of day-in-the-life film will not be overruled
notwithstanding its alleged cumulative nature if probative value outweighs any prejudice);
Apache Ready Mix Co. v. Creed, 653 S.W.2d 79, 83-84 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (day-in-the-life
video of semicomatose quadriplegic admitted because evidentiary value and relevance
outweighed prejudice resulting from repetitiveness); Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 24 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 528, 533-34 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (since film is "best evidence of the plaintiff's pain
and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life," it is not cumulative).
The discord among decisions involving challenges based on the cumulative nature of
videos stems, at least in part, from a broader dispute over whether photographic evidence can
ever be cumulative of other non-photographic evidence. Compare United States v. Falcon,
766 F.2d 1469, 1477-78 (10th Cir. 1985) (video excluded because expert witness previously
testified about subject matter) and Balian v. General Motors Corp. 296 A.2d 317, 322 (N.J.
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inflammatory, 116 and that they delve into collateral issues.'37  Likewise,
questions over the methodology of recordation, staging, editing, or other
material alterations remain as stumbling blocks for admissibility.
138
Notwithstanding these impediments to admissibility, courts have been
increasingly more receptive to day-in-the-life video evidence. For example,
after noting the various theoretical concerns inherent in day-in-the-life
videos, the court in Bannister v. Town of Noble,'39 upheld admission even
though it recognized that some of the footage depicted the plaintiff
"conducting activities that he would be unlikely to do frequently."' 40
Likewise in the oft-cited Grimes v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance
Co. 141 case, the court rejected arguments that the film was selective and
cumulative and constituted inadmissible hearsay. As the court observed,
"[t]he films illustrate, better than words, the impact the injury has had on the
plaintiffs life in terms of pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life.
While the scenes are unpleasant, so is plaintiffs injury."'142  Some courts
attempt to mitigate the prejudicial impact of day-in-the-life videos either by
limiting the scope of their use or by giving limiting instructions. 143
1972) (film deemed cumulative in light of previous testimony of expert witness) with Grimes
v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 73 F.R.D. 607, 610 (D. Alaska 1977) (photographic
evidence is generally cumulative only of other similar photographic evidence). See also 2
CHARLES C. ScoTT, PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE § 1022 (2d ed. 1993). Regardless of whether
the video is technically cumulative of other evidence, the court retains the authority to weigh
whether excluding inflammatory film would deprive the plaintiff of critical damages
testimony. If plenty of other damages evidence exists, the court can discharge a conventional
Rule 403 balancing analysis and exclude a film that might arouse undue sympathy from the
jury. Haley v. Byers Transp. Co., 414 S.W.2d 777, 780 (Mo. 1967) (excluding day-in-the-
life film since, inter alia, considerable other evidence existed to convey plaintiff's message);
Ashley v. Nissan Motor Corp., 321 So. 2d 868, 872 (La. Ct. App. 1975). See also Easterling
v. Weedman, 54 Ark. App. 22, 37, 922 S.W.2d 735, 742 (1996) ("[T]he probative value of
evidence correlates inversely to the availability of other means of proving the issue.").
136. See, e.g., Thomas v. C.G. Tate Constr. Co., 465 F. Supp. 566, 570-71 (D.S.C.
1979); Butler v. Chrestman, 264 So. 2d 812 (Miss. 1972).
137. DeBiasio v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 52 F.3d 678, 687 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 1040 (1996). See also In re Marriage of Willis, 599 N.E.2d 179, 182 (Ill. App. Ct.
1992) (proscribing use of day-in-the-life video at child custody proceeding in light of statute
requiring presence of counsel during interview of child and potential for adverse effect on
children).
138. For a discussion of considerations in preparing and authenticating or challenging
day-in-the-life videos, see Fred I. Heller, Planning and Producing A "Day-in-the-Life"
Videotape in a Personal Injury Lawsuit, 39 261 (1989), and Fred I. Heller, Using or
Challenging a "Day-in-the-Life " Documentary in a Personal Injury Lawsuit, 40 249, § 949-
59 (1990) (discussing modes of challenging such videos).
139. 812 F.2d 1265 (10th Cir. 1987).
140. Id. at 1270.
141. 73 F.R.D. 607 (D. Alaska 1977).
142. Id. at 610.
143. See, e.g., Elk Corp. v. Jackson, 291 Ark. 448, 457, 725 S.W.2d 829, 834 (1987)
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The case law is bereft of any formulaic approach toward authenticating
day-in-the-life films. Nevertheless, several key themes emerge. As an
initial matter, proper authentication requires testimony from a qualified
witness that the scenes depicted on the video are indeed representative of the
plaintiffs prototypical day.'" Since day-in-the life videos are normally
heavily edited, the sponsoring witness should testify as to who was involved
in the filming, how the filming and editing were conducted and, most
importantly, establish that the film fairly and accurately portrays what it is
intended to portray.145
B. Discovery of Surveillance and Day-in-the-Life Videos
Discovery'46 of surveillance films has been litigated extensively at the
federal and state court level. Defendants have argued, with varying degrees
of success, that pretrial disclosure blunts the impact of effective cross-
examination since it enables the plaintiff to tailor his testimony to the
information depicted in the films. Several courts have agreed, rebuffing
pretrial disclosure since it would merely "frustrate an effective cross-
examination and ... avoid the possibility of impeachment."'' 47
The clear majority view, however, is that notwithstanding the
legitimacy of such concerns and the fact that such films normally constitute
work product, surveillance films are discoverable prior to trial. 148  Most
(day-in-the-life video played with sound turned off); DeBiasio v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 52 F.3d
678, 687 (7th Cir. 1995) (limiting instruction).
144. Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 528, 530 & n.5 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)
(nurse properly authenticated video by testifying that she was present during filming, had
previously seen plaintiff prior to filming, and was aware of her routine).
145. Once admitted, the day-in-the-life video can be shown in closing statements. See
Bannister, 812 F.2d at 1271.
146. For purposes of discovery, courts have ruled that a request for "photographs" may,
in some instances, be construed to encompass videotapes. See Crawford v. Deets, 828
S.W.2d 795, 799 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (upholding exclusion of videotape that was not
produced following discovery request for "photographs"); Kiss v. Jacob, 633 A.2d 544, 547-
48 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 650 A.2d 336 (N.J. 1994).
147. Mort v. A/S D/S Svendborg, 41 F.R.D. 225, 227-28 (E.D. Pa. 1966). Accord Hickel
v. Abousy, 41 F.R.D. 152, 155 (D. Md. 1966). See also Wilson v. Southern Ry., 431 S.E.2d
383, 387-88 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (affirming admission of surveillance tape despite claims that
plaintiff was not informed of its existence until second day of trial), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1303 (1994).
148. See, e.g., Chiasson v. Zapata Gulf Marine Corp., 988 F.2d 513, 517-18 (5th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1536 (1994); Wegner v. Cliff Viessman, Inc., 153 F.R.D. 154,
156-60 (N.D. Iowa 1994); Martin v. Long Island R.R., 63 F.R.D. 53, 54-55 (E.D.N.Y. 1974);
La Villarena, Inc. v. Acosta, 597 So. 2d 336 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Collins v. Crosby
Group, Inc., 551 So. 2d 42 (La. Ct. App. 1989). Such rulings are premised primarily on the
need to be able to verify the video's accuracy, through the use of experts or otherwise, long
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courts that have adopted this position have tempered its effect by ruling that
a defendant need not make such disclosure until after the plaintiffs
deposition.'49 Such an approach quells the potential for the plaintiff to
exaggerate his condition, but preserves an avenue for impeachment for the
defense in case the plaintiff lies. 5
Discovery of day-in-the-life films has also been hotly contested. While
there has been little dispute about whether defense counsel may inspect the
plaintiffs day-in-the-life video, the timing of such discovery has prompted
serious controversy. Given the potential for selective editing, defense
counsel in Cisarik v. Palos Community Hospital' sought leave to be able
to attend the filming of the plaintiffs day-in-the-life video.5 2 The trial
court granted such relief, but the defendant was subsequently rebuffed by
the Illinois Appellate Court and by a divided Illinois Supreme Court, 53
which ruled that the defense had no such right.
While the Cisarik decision has been strongly and justifiably
criticized,' the defense bar is not left wholly remediless. Just as the trend
is toward full discovery of surveillance films, the defense should also be
permitted full discovery of day-in-the-life videos and all related outtakes.
Even when such discovery fails to provide a basis for successfully
challenging the introduction of the video, the defense may request bifurca-
tion of the liability and damages phases of the trial,'55 and/or seek to play
before trial and, secondarily, on the notion that full discovery may promote settlement. See
also Ponder v. Cartmel, 301 Ark. 409, 413, 784 S.W.2d 758, 761 (1990). In light of work
product concerns, production of surveillance films that are not intended to be used at trial
should not normally be compelled. See Fisher v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 152 F.R.D.
145, 150-55 (S.D. Ind. 1993). But see Daniels v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., I 10 F.R.D.
160, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (requiring production of all films); Corrigan v. Methodist Hosp.,
158 F.R.D. 54, 58-59 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
149. See Forbes v. Hawaiian Tug & Barge Corp., 125 F.R.D. 505, 508 (D. Haw. 1989);
Daniels v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 110 F.R.D. 160, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Snead v.
American Export - Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 148, 151-52 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Cabral
v. Arruda, 556 A.2d 47 (R.I. 1989); Rodger v. New York, 585 N.Y.S.2d 32, 32 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1992) (disclosure delayed pending second deposition of plaintiff). Likewise, at least one
court has ruled that, if defense counsel ultimately decides against using surveillance videos
at trial, plaintiff may not comment on such a tactical decision. See DiMichel v. South
Buffalo Ry., 604 N.E.2d 63, 69 (N.Y. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 68 (1993).
150. See Wegner, 153 F.R.D. at 160.
151. 549 N.E.2d 840 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
152. Id. at 842.
153. 579 N.E.2d 873 (Il1. 1991). But see id. at 877 (Miller, C.J., dissenting) ("[D]ay-in-
the-life film is a distinct type of evidence, one that is not simply equivalent to still
photographs, charts, and graphs .... Indeed, there might be circumstances in which a film
will not be admissible unless opposing counsel has been afforded the opportunity to attend
its preparation.").
154. See Graham & Lapp, supra, note 119, at 587-92.
155. See Grimes v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 73 F.R.D. 607, 610 (D. Alaska 1977).
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the video and then question prospective jurors during voir dire in an effort
to identify jurors who would be unduly impacted by the film. 156
V. RECOVERY OF COSTS
The reported federal case law regarding the recovery of costs for
videotaped depositions is marked by utter discord. Some courts have
permitted only the costs of a regular stenographer's deposition, and other
courts have fashioned alternative remedies.'57 One leading decision,
Commercial Credit Equipment Corp. v. Stamps,'58 embraced a Solomon-like
approach-allowing recovery of the expense of videotaping and replaying
depositions at trial, but foreclosing recovery of a court reporter's steno-
graphic transcription fees.'59
Such penurious approaches ignore both the practical realities of the
situation as well as the fact that under Rules 26 and 32 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, a party seeking to use a videotaped deposition at trial
must normally submit an accompanying transcript. 6° Given the primary
rationale for permitting videotaped depositions-that juries' credibility
determination and fact finding are significantly enhanced through the visual
medium' 6'-and considering the fact that rules require written transcripts to
accompany the videotape, courts should normally award the prevailing party
reasonable videotaping, playback, and transcription expenses.
62
156. Roberts v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Servs., 556 N.E.2d 662 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
See also Graham & Lapp, supra note 119, at 592-94.
157. See Fressell v. AT&T Technologies, 103 F.R.D. 111, 116 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (limiting
recovery to the then-existing $30 per diem witness fee); Coats v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 5
F.3d 877, 891 (5th Cir. 1993) (denying recovery of video technician's fees on the grounds
that such are not provided for under 28 U.S.C. § 1920), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1303 (1994);
Echostar Satellite Corp. v. Advanced Communications Corp., 902 F. Supp. 213, 215-16 (D.
Col. 1995) (same). Cf Pearce v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 637 F.2d 536, 543-44 (8th Cir.
1980) (disallowing costs of videotaping undertaken in wake of party's refusal to admit certain
facts).
158. 920 F.2d 1361 (7th Cir. 1990).
159. Id. at 1368-69. The court reached this result even though the expense was greater
than that of two stenographically-recorded depositions. But see Miller v. National R.R.
Passenger Corp., 157 F.R.D. 145 (D. Mass 1994) (refusing to award costs for videotaping
and playback in court of physician's deposition on the grounds that they are not authorized
under 28 U.S.C. § 1920). Accord, Barber v. Ruth, 7 F.3d 636, 645 (7th Cir. 1993); Macario
v. Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc., No. CIV.A. 90-3906, 1995 WL 550444 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 14,
1995); Jamison v. Cooper, 111 F.R.D. 350, 352 (N.D. Ga. 1986). See also Gordon v. Castle
Oldsmobile & Honda, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 438, 442 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (ruling that stenographic
transcription costs of videotaped depositions are not recoverable).
160. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(B) & 32(c).
161. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
162. See Garonzik v. Whitman Diner, 910 F. Supp 167, 170-72 (D.N.J. 1995); Weseloh-
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VI. CONCLUSION
The technological explosion over the last two generations has fostered
an expectation that communication is often best received through a
television screen. It was therefore inevitable that videotapes would become
standard equipment for most trial lawyers. However, the entree into the
courtroom has not been without growing pains'63 for the simple fact that, as
in many areas, technological changes have generally outpaced accompanying
evidentiary advances."M
Yet, in many respects, the pendulum has swung. During the past
fifteen years judicial responses to proffered videographic evidence have
closed some of the gap and ushered in a relatively more relaxed courtroom
atmosphere toward admissibility. This can be seen not only in the
promulgation of rules that have facilitated the use of videotaped depositions,
but also in wider use of such foundational innovations as the "silent
witness" theory, and in greater receptivity towards the admission of
videographic accident reconstructions and day-in-the-life documentaries.
The irony is that, as courts have become less apprehensive about the
technology-and particularly less wary about the prospects for fabrica-
tion--the technology itself has mutated. The emergence of digital
technology has breathed new life into concerns about the prospects of
manipulation and outright fabrication of videographic evidence. While this
potential should not cast a pall over the entire field of videographic
authentication, it does call for some degree of caution.
Notwithstanding these concerns, courts should not lose sight of the fact
that videographic evidence--whether illustrative or substantive--can play a
vital role at trial. If the ultimate goal is to insure that jurors have the best
possible tools to unravel disputes, then the use of videotapes should be
encouraged and impediments to full-scale implementation of the medium
Hurtig v. Hepker, 152 F.R.D. 198 (D. Kan. 1993) (awarding costs of videotaping and
stenographic transcriptions); Meredith v. Schreiner Transp., Inc., 814 F. Supp. 1004, 1006
(D. Kan. 1993) (same). Barring amendment to the current language in Rule 30 of the
Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure or to the proposed revisions, see supra note 28, there is
no authority in Arkansas state court for the recovery of any expenses associated with video
depositions. See Wood v. Tyler, 317 Ark. 319, 322, 877 S.W.2d 582, 583 (1994). In light
of the analysis outlined above, the proposed amendments to the Arkansas Rules of Civil
Procedure should be revised to provide for recovery of such costs.
163. See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 214, at 17 (John W. Strong et al. eds., 4th ed.
1992).
164. See Jordan S. Gruber et al., Video Technology, in 58 AM. JUR. TRIALS § 64 (1996)
(discussing technological changes in videography). Cf Aside, The Common Law Origins of
the Infield Fly Rule, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1474, 1477-78 (1975) (chronicling regulatory
responses in the wake of strategic innovations in the game of baseball).
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such as overly penurious limitations on recovery of costs and certain
unnecessarily onerous chain-of-custody foundational hurdles, should be
eliminated.

